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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a). 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PRINSBURG'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Prinsburg correctly identified the issue upon which this Court granted certiorari 
and the correct standard of review to be applied by this Court in reviewing the Court of 
Appeal's decision. 
Defendants, however, object to Prinsburg's statement of issues raised in its appeal 
below and the appropriate standards of review as follows: 
Objection to Prinsburg's Issue No. 2: Prinsburg's Issue No. 2 asks whether "the 
trial court err[ed] in considering the action to be a deficiency action, including barring a 
deficiency judgment for commercial unreasonableness, even though no collateral of 
Alpine was sold." [Court of Appeals Appellate Brief at p. 2 (emphasis added)]. Prinsburg 
should be barred from disputing the fact that it foreclosed collateral securing the Alpine 
Loan - a fact that it stipulated to before the Trial Court. In the Stipulated Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Prinsburg stipulated to the following Findings of Fact: 
1. In or around late 2006 and without providing notice to Defendants, Plaintiff and 
Vision Experts, dba Knighton Vision, held a private disposition of collateral in 
possession of Knighton Optical, including the collateral securing the Alpine 
Vision Loan. [R. at 579, Tf 9, Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Addendum Exhibit 1; emphasis added]. 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Plaintiff received $80,000 for the property, including the collateral securing the 
Alpine Vision Loan, in Knighton Optical's possession. [R. at 579, ^ 1 1 ; emphasis 
added]. 
Furthermore, not only has Prinsburg stipulated to the fact that the private 
disposition of collateral included collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loans, Prinsburg 
failed to submit any evidence to the Trial Court contrary to the factual finding. 
Even if Prinsburg hadn't stipulated to the fact that it had foreclosed collateral 
securing the Alpine Vision Loan, Issue No. 2 does not involve a mere question of law as 
asserted by Prinsburg. The issue of whether Alpine's collateral was sold is a mixed 
question of law and fact. The trial court made the factual determination that the collateral 
securing the Alpine Vision Loan was sold by Prinsburg and the legal conclusion that 
pursuant to UCC Article 9 interest in collateral continues "notwithstanding sale, lease, 
license, exchange, or other disposition. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-315(a). [R. at 
544]. 
The grant or denial of summary judgment is generally reviewed under the standard 
of correctness. See Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, ^8, 178 P.3d 930. However, 
mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed by considering "the following factors: (1) 
the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; 
(2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed 
by the trial judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion 
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to trial courts." State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50 [^25, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
Objection to Prinsburg's Issue No. 3: Prinsburg's Issue No. 3 asks whether the 
Trial Court erred in denying Prinsburg's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment "even though Defendants expressly waived 
the defense of impairment of collateral in the guaranties." [Brief of Appellant at p. 2]. 
Prinsburg failed to raise this issue below and, therefore, should be barred from raising it 
for the first time on appeal. "As a general rule, in order for an appellate court to review 
contentions of error on appeal, the errors must be objected to or be preserved in the trial 
court record." Utah v. Honie, 2002 UT 4 f 15, 57 P.3d 977. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Contrary to Prinsburg's assertion that there are no determinative statutory 
provisions, Defendants assert that the following statutory provisions are determinative if 
this Court accepts Prinsburg's requests to render a decision on the merits of Prinsburg's 
original appeal: 
3 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-608.} Application of proceeds of collection or 
enforcement - Liability for deficiency and right to surplus. 
(1) If a security interest or agricultural lien secures payment or performance of 
an obligation, the following rules apply: 
(a) A secured party shall apply or pay over for application the cash 
proceeds of collection or enforcement under Section 70A-9a-607 in the 
following order to: 
(i) the reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement and, to 
the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law, 
reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured 
party; 
(ii) the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest 
or agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement is 
made; and 
(iii) the satisfaction of obligations secured by any subordinate 
security interest in or other lien on the collateral subject to the 
security interest or agricultural lien under which the collection or 
enforcement is made if the secured party receives an authenticated 
demand for proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is 
completed. 
(b) If requested by a secured party, a holder of a subordinate security 
interest or other lien shall furnish reasonable proof of the interest or lien 
within a reasonable time. Unless the holder complies, the secured party 
need not comply with the holder's demand under Subsection (l)(a)(iii). 
(c) A secured party need not apply or pay over for application noncash 
proceeds of collection and enforcement under Section 70A-9a-607 unless 
the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. A secured party 
The Trial Court determined that the version of Article 9 that took effect in 2001 
and was in effect at the time Prinsburg disposed of the Alpine Vision Collateral should 
govern this dispute based on § 70A-9a-702(l), which states that "this act applies to a 
transaction or lien within its scope, even it the transaction or lien was entered into or 
created before this act takes effect." Utah Code Ann. §70A-9a-702(l). Accordingly, all 
citations to UCC Article 9 are to the 2006 version, which took effect in 2001. [R. ait 542-
548]. 
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that applies or pays over for application noncash proceeds shall do so in a 
commercially reasonable manner. 
(d) A secured party shall account to and pay a debtor for any surplus, 
and the obligor is liable for any deficiency. 
(2) If the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment 
intangibles, or promissory notes, the debtor is not entitled to any surplus, and 
the obligor is not liable for any deficiency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-610. Disposition of collateral after default 
(1) After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose 
of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing. 
(2) Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, 
time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable. If commercially 
reasonable, a secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private 
proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and 
place and on any terms. 
(3) A secured party may purchase collateral: 
(a) at a public disposition; or 
(b) at a private disposition only if the collateral is of a kind that is 
customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of widely 
distributed standard price quotations. 
(4) A contract for sale, lease, license, or other disposition includes the 
warranties relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and the like which by 
operation of law accompany a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject 
to the contract. 
(5) A secured party may disclaim or modify warranties under Subsection (4): 
(a) in a manner that would be effective to disclaim or modify the 
warranties in a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the 
contract of disposition; or 
(b) by communicating to the purchaser a record evidencing the contract 
for disposition and including an express disclaimer or modification of the 
warranties. 
5 
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(6) A record is sufficient to disclaim warranties under Subsection (5) if it 
indicates "There is no warranty relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, or the 
like in this disposition" or uses words of similar import. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-611. Notification before disposition of collateral 
(1) In this section, "notification date" means the earlier of the date on which: 
(a) a secured party sends to the debtor and any secondary obligor an 
authenticated notification of disposition; or 
(b) the debtor and any secondary obligor waive the right to notification. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), a secured party that 
disposes of collateral under Section 70A-9a-610 shall send to the persons specified 
in Subsection (3) a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition. 
(3) To comply with Subsection (2), the secured party shall send an 
authenticated notification of disposition to: 
(a) the debtor; 
(b) any secondary obligor; and 
(c) if the collateral is other than consumer goods: 
(i) any other person from which the secured party has received, 
before the notification date, an authenticated notification of a claim 
of an interest in the collateral; 
(ii) any other secured party or lienholder that, 10 days before the 
notification date, held a security interest in or other lien on the 
collateral perfected by the filing of a financing statement that: 
(A) identified the collateral; 
(B) was indexed under the debtor's name as of that date; 
and 
(C) was filed in the office in which to file a financing 
statement against the debtor covering the collateral as of that 
date; and 
(iii) any other secured party that, 10 days before the notification 
date, held a security interest in the collateral perfected by 
c 
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compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty described in 
Subsection 70A-9a-311(1). 
(4) Subsection (2) does not apply if the collateral is perishable or threatens to 
decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market. 
(5) A secured party complies with the requirement for notification prescribed 
by Subsection (3)(c)(ii) if: 
(a) not later than 20 days or earlier than 30 days before the notification 
date, the secured party requests, in a commercially reasonable manner, 
information concerning financing statements indexed under the debtor's 
name in the office indicated in Subsection (3)(c)(ii); and 
(b) before the notification date, the secured party: 
(i) did not receive a response to the request for information; or 
(ii) received a response to the request for information and sent an 
authenticated notification of disposition to each secured party or 
other lienholder named in that response whose financing statement 
covered the collateral. 
70A-9a-624. Waiver. 
(1) A debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification of 
disposition of collateral under Section 70A-9a-611 only by an agreement to that 
effect entered into and authenticated after default. 
(2) A debtor may waive the right to require disposition of collateral under 
Subsection 70A-9a-620(5) only by an agreement to that effect entered into and 
authenticated after default. 
(3) Except in a consumer-goods transaction, a debtor or secondary obligor may waive 
the right to redeem collateral under Section 70A-9a-623 only by an agreement to that 
effect entered into and authenticated after default. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants object to Prinsburg's Statement of the Case to the extent it goes 
beyond the requirements under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(7) by 
engaging in argument. Accordingly, Defendants set forth the following Statement of the 
Case: 
Nature of the Case 
This action was commenced by Plaintiff Prinsburg State Bank to enforce the 
personal Guaranties of Defendants Abundo, Atwood, Baker and Gold ("Guarantors") 
which were signed to guaranty re-payment of two loans made to Defendant Alpine 
Vision ("Alpine Loans") by Prinsburg's predecessor First Security Bank.2 
Course of Proceedings 
Prinsburg moved for summary judgment on October 3, 2007. and Defendants filed 
a cross motion for summary judgment on November 7, 2007. A hearing was held on 
August 26, 2008, wherein oral argument was heard on the cross motions for summary 
judgment. 
Disposition by Trial Court 
On November 4, 2008, the Trial Court issued its Ruling Denying Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Granting Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend the Answer. The Trial 
Defendant Alpine Vision, along with Defendants Robert Thurston, Knighton 
Optical, Inc., were not served and have not participated in any manner in this lawsuit. 
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Court held, however, that there remained a material issue of fact in whether the sale of 
the Alpine Vision Collateral was commercially reasonable - a fact burden of Prinsburg. 
Rather than proceed to trial on the issue of valuation for determination of commercial 
reasonableness, Prinsburg stipulated to findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent 
with the Trial Court's Ruling on the Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, including a 
stipulation that Prinsburg's disposed of the Alpine Vision collateral and that the 
disposition of collateral was not commercially reasonable. Pursuant to those Findings, 
Defendants were the prevailing party and were entitled to an award of their attorney fees 
and costs incurred in defending against Prinsburg's claims. Following submission of an 
application for attorney fees and costs and supporting affidavit* the Trial Court granted 
Defendants their attorney fees and costs. On September 3, 2010, the Trial Court entered 
its Amended Final Judgment and Order, granting a judgment in favor of Defendants for 
$61,089.86. 
Disposition on Appeal 
Prinsburg appealed from the September 3, 2010 Amended Final Judgment. On 
May 5, 2011, following the initial briefing, but prior to oral argument, the Court of 
Appeals issued an Order directing the Parties to submit supplemental briefing on the 
effect of the Parties' Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the ability to 
raise the proposed issues on appeal. Following briefing and oral argument on May 31, 
2011, the Court of Appeals issued its Opinion on July 29, 2011, wherein it affirmed the 
Trial Courf s final judgment and held Prinsburg failed to preserve its arguments for 
appeal. Prinsburg request for certiorari was granted and this appeal followed. 
9 
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DEFEND ANTS' RESPONSE TO PRINSBURG'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants dispute that paragraphs 1-8 and 10-13 of Prinsburg's Statement of 
Facts are relevant to the issue presented for this Court's review. Defendants further 
dispute any statements of facts contained in paragraphs 1-8 and 10-13 that are contrary to 
the facts set forth in the Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, which are set 
forth below/ [Addendum Exhibit 1]. 
Defendants dispute paragraph 17 of Prinsburg's Statement of Facts to the extent 
that it overstates Defendants' understanding of the issue that Prinsburg intended to 
present on appeal following the entry of the Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. As repeatedly stated by Defendants, it was their understanding at all times that 
Prinsburg only intended to raise on appeal the claim that due to the language of the 
Guarantees, the Uniform Commercial Code did not apply to this case. 
Defendants dispute paragraphs 18-19, 21-23 of Prinsburg's Statement of Facts on 
the grounds that those paragraphs are primarily argument rather than statement of facts. 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACT 
In the event that this Court accepts Prinsburg's invitation to render a decision on 
Prinsburg's initial appeal, Defendants set forth the following statement of the stipulated 
facts as set forth in the December 8, 2009, Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: [R. at 577-583]. 
J
 Prinsburg has previously stated that it "does not challenge any of the stipulated 
facts." Petition at 11, footnote 3. 
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1. In approximately 1994 Defendant Lindsay Atwood and a business partner 
formed Alpine Vision, Inc., which operated a vision care business at a number of 
locations along the Wasatch Front. [Id. at 578, ^ 1]. 
2. In or around 1997 Knighton Optical purchased a majority interest in Alpine 
Vision and within a couple of years became the sole owner of Alpine Vision. Thus, 
Knighton Optical took possession of Alpine and all of its personal property, which 
included Alpine Vision's eye examination equipment. [Id. at ^ 2]. 
3. Knighton Optical caused Alpine Vision to enter into two loan agreements 
on March 30, 1998 and August 27, 1999 with First Security Bank ("Alpine Vision 
Loans"), Plaintiffs predecessor in interest. [Id. at f^ 3 ]. 
4. The Alpine Vision Loans totaled $150,000, and were secured by Alpine 
Vision's equipment, inventory, accounts, and general intangibles. [Id. at f 4]. 
5. At the time that the Alpine Vision Loans were executed, Knighton Optical 
was the majority shareholder of Alpine Vision. [Id. at If 2]. 
6. Defendants Atwood, Abundo, and Baker4 each executed personal 
guaranties for the Alpine Vision Loans, on or about July 28, 1999. [Id. at ^ 5]. 
As clarified in Prinsburg's Brief, Defendant Gold has no recollection of signing 
the Guaranty and denies that he signed the Guaranty, but "for the purpose of resolving 
this dispute, Defendant Gold stipulates that he is a guarantor of the Alpine Vision Loan." 
[R. at 5784 6]. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7. On or around February 15, 200L Knighton Optical purchased the 
remaining equity interest in Alpine Vision and thus became the sole owner of Alpine 
Vision.5 [Id at «j  7; R. at 387-391]. 
8. The last payment on the Alpine Vision Loans was made on or around 
January 24, 2005. [Id at 579, ^ 8]. 
9. In late 2006 and without providing notice to Defendants, Prinsburg 
conducted a private disposition of collateral in possession of Knighton Optical, including 
the collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan. Prinsburg sold the Alpine collateral to 
Knighton Optical's successor, Vision Experts, dba Knighton Vision ("Knighton Vision"). 
[Id at T! 9; see also R. at 459-460; 468-473]. 
10. No evidence of the value of the disposed collateral was presented to the 
Court by Prinsburg. [Id. at Tj 10; see also R. at 459-460; 466-467]. 
11. Prinsburg received $80,000 for the property, including the collateral 
securing the Alpine Vision Loans, in Knighton Optical's possession. [Id. at f^ 11]. 
12. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of the disposition 
proceeds that were attributable to the Alpine Vision Loan collateral. [Id. at f^ 12; R. at 
546]. 
3
 The Findings of Fact inartfully stated that "Knighton Optical purchased the 
remaining interest in Alpine Vision and became the sole owner of Alpine Visions' assets 
. . . . " Of course, purchase of an equity interest in a company does not give the purchaser 
title to the purchased company's assets - although it has complete control over such 
assets owned by its subsidiary. In any event, as discussed below, this is irrelevant. 
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13. Prinsburg did not apply any of the proceeds from the private disposition to 
the Alpine Vision Loans but instead, applied the entire amount to Knighton Optical's 
debts. [Id at If 13]. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Again, in the event that this Court accepts Prinsburg's invitation to render a decision 
on Prinsburg's original appeal, the following additional facts are relevant to the issues: 
1. At the time Defendants Abundo, Atwood, and Baker executed the subject 
guaranties they understood that the Alpine Vision Loan was secured by collateral owned 
by Alpine Vision, which included Alpine Vision's eye examination equipment. [R. at 
445 (Abundo Affidavit), 448 (Atwood Affidavit), 452 (Baker Affidavit); R. at 437-442 
(Commercial Security Agreement)]. 
2. Alpine Vision business registration expired on May 5, 2002, but there is no 
evidence that it was dissolved or that it did not continue to exist as a business entity. [R. 
at 393 (Utah Business Entity Search Result, Prinsburg Court of Appeals Appendix 
Exhibit "O")]. 
3. In conducting the private disposition of collateral, Plaintiff did not make 
any effort to distinguish between property owned by Knighton Optical and Alpine 
Vision. [R. at 459-462; 466-467 (Ulferts Deposition Transcript)]. 
4. Knighton Optical's inventory records segregated the Knighton propery 
from Alpine Vision's up until at least April, 2005. [R. at 475-507 (specifically 506-507); 
165-210]. 
13 
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5. Plaintiff never conducted any sort of valuation of the disposed collateral 
nor did it seek other purchasers. [R. at 463-465]. 
6. According to Knighton Optical's/Alpine Vision's own records provided to 
Plaintiff on April 18, 2005, Alpine Vision's equipment had a fully depreciated value of 
between approximately $250,000.00 and $348,000.00, depending on the accounting 
method utilized. [R. at 165-210; 475-507]. 
7. Although Defendants did not receive notice of the private disposition of 
collateral, Prinsburg did provide notice of its foreclosure of the Alpine Vision Collateral. 
[R. at 468-473 (Notification of Private Disposition of Collateral, Addendum Exhibit 3)]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that it was barred from reviewing the 
merits of Prinsburg's original appeal as a result of Prinsburg's stipulation to the 
Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the language of the Amended 
Final Judgment. The Court of Appeals is bound to enforce the stipulation of the parties 
and terms of the final judgment. 
In the event that the Utah Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and 
addresses the merits of Prinsburg's original appeal, Defendants state that the Trial Court 
correctly determined that UCC Article 9 applied to Prinsburg's foreclosure on the Alpine 
Vision Collateral and whether Prinsburg complied with the requirements of UCC Article 
9. The Trial Court correctly determined that UCC Article 9 applied and that Prinsburg 
failed to comply with those requirements, which renders Prinsburg's foreclosure 
commercially unreasonable and prohibits Prinsburg's recovery on the guaranties. 
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All relevant facts have been established through stipulation and support in the 
Record, and Prinsburg should be barred from challenging them. It cannot be disputed 
that Prinsburg elected to foreclose on the Alpine Vision Collateral failed to provide 
notice, that Defendants did not waive their right to notice, that the Alpine Vision Loan 
was secured by the Alpine Vision Collateral that the proceeds from the foreclosure on 
the Alpine Vision Collateral were not applied to the Alpine Vision Loan, and that 
Prinsburg cannot establish the total amount owed under the guaranties. As a result, 
Prinsburg's foreclosure was not commercially reasonable, and Prinsburg should be 
precluded from recovery on the guaranties. 
PRESERVATION ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT WAS 
BARRED FROM REVIEWING PRINSBURG'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS. 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Stipulated Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and subsequent Amended Final Judgment based on those 
Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, barred its review of the issues 
appealed below. Defendants do not dispute that in entering into the Stipulated Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law it was their understanding that Prinsburg might later 
appeal only the issue of the applicability of UCC Article 9 to its attempted enforcement 
of the guarantees. Flowever, given that Prinsburg failed to include such reservation in the 
Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and/or the proposed Amended Final 
Judgment drafted by Prinsburg, the Court of Appeals made the correct decision. 
15 
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In its Brief of Appellant submitted to this Court, Prinsburg argues that it preserved 
its legal and factual arguments for appeal by raising those arguments at the trial court 
level. [See Brief of Appellant at pp. 14-21]. However, in making that argument, 
Prinsburg misses the point of the Court of Appeals' Opinion. The Court of Appeals held 
that Prinsburg failed to preserve those issues for appeal because Prinsburg agreed to the 
Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (entered into after the summary 
judgment ruling) and failed to object to or seek relief from the Amended Final Judgment 
entered by the Trial Court. [July 29, 2011 Opinion, Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, et 
al, 2011 UT App 239,1fl[ 9-10 ("Opinion"), Addendum Exhibit 2]. The Court of 
Appeals did not make any determination as to whether Prinsburg's factual and legal 
arguments were raised at the trial court level before the Stipulated Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Instead, it held that it could not even address those issues. 
[Opinion at ffi[ 10-12]. 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that it was bound by the express 
language in the both the Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Amended Final Judgment: 
Here, the parties unambiguously stipulated to the factual resolution 
of the sole issue that survived summary judgment, and their written 
stipulation expressly stated that it uresolve[d] this matter in its 
entirety in favor of Defendants." (Emphasis added.) Any doubt that 
the stipulation resolved the entire matter was removed when the 
district court entered judgment, in an order drafted and submitted by 
Prinsburg's counsel, dismissing all of Prinsburg9s claims, "[bjased 
upon . . . the [parties'] Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
ofLaw." 
[Opinion at«[] 9 (alterations in original)]. 
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The recent decision by this Court in Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, 266 P.3d 
828, relied upon by Prinsburg, while instructive on the general preservation of issues for 
appeal does not address the preservation issue presented by the Parties' Stipulated 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In Patterson, this Court concluded that it 
could not ignore controlling statutory law even if counsel failed to argue it below. Id. at \ 
21. That is significantly different from the Court of Appeals conclusion that Prinsburg 
was bound by its stipulation to the Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Amended Final Judgment. [Opinion at f^ 9, 11]. 
Similarly, it is well established that a party may wraive its right to raise an issue on 
appeal by its own actions. See, e.g., Gardner v. Board of County Commissioners, 2008 
UT 6, f44-47, 178 P.3d 893. In Gardner, the plaintiff acquiesced to entry of summary 
judgment on certain issues with the intent to raise those issues on appeal. Id. The 
Gardner court held that plaintiffs acquiescence to the judgment prohibited plaintiff from 
later attacking it on appeal. Id. Likewise, a party may waive its right to appeal by 
failing to preserve the issue for appeal. See, e.g., Tschaggeny v. Milbank, Inc. Co., 2007 
UT 37, f22-25, 163 P.3d 615. In Tschaggeny the court concluded that the plaintiff failed 
to adequately preserve an issue for appeal by failing to move for a continuance, which 
would have allowed the trial judge an opportunity to consider the issue. Id. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT PRINSBURG 
SHOULD FIRST SEEK ITS RELIEF WITH THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that Prinsburg should have sought its relief 
from the judgment with the trial court first, prior to bringing its appeal. Prinsburg argues 
17 
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that the parties did not intend for the Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the Amended Final Judgment, which was drafted by and stipulated to by the parties' 
counsel, expressly states that it c;resolve[d] this matter in its entirety in favor of 
Defendants," to be of such scope to create an issue of preservation. [Petition at 12; 
Opinion at j^ 9]. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals, determinations as to the 
intended scope of a stipulation present questions of fact that, in the first instance, are 
appropriately directed to the Trial Court. [Opinion at j^ 8 (citing Davenport at Pilgrims 
Landing Homeowners Ass }n v. Davenport at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, j^ 73, 
221 P3d 234)]. The Trial Court must be granted an opportunity to rule on that issue in 
order to preserve the issue for appeal. [Id. (citing 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 
2004 UT 72,^| 51, 99 P.3d 801)]. 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the proper procedure for Prinsburg 
to seek relief for its complaints concerning the effect or scope of the stipulation and/or 
Judgment is to first seek relief directly from the Trial Court: 
If Prinsburg believed that the judgment of complete dismissal exceeded the scope 
of the parties' agreement, it should have sought relief from the judgment in the 
district court on that basis. Such relief could have been sought pursuant to rule 59 
or 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Prinsburg's failure to seek such relief 
renders its current argument unpreserved for appeal, and we decline to address 
them. 
[Opinion at |^ 10]. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that "Prinsburg failed to 
preserve these issues for appeal when it stipulated to their resolution and did not 
subsequently ask the district court to limit or modify the judgment resulting therefrom." 
[Opinion at f^ 7]. Despite the Appeals Court's clear ruling on failure to preserve the 
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issues and direction that Prinsburg should seek relief from the Judgment directly from the 
Trial Court Prinsburg chose not to seek relief from the Trial Court and instead to file its 
Petition. [See Opinion at *| 11 footnote 1 ("We do not intend our decision to preclude 
Prinsburg from prospectively seeking relief from the judgment in the district court")]. As 
the preservation issue remains, Prinsburg's appeal should be denied. 
SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT 
Prinsburg has expressly asked this Court to "review the matter on the substance of 
the claims briefed before the Court of Appeals." [Brief of Appellant at p. 30]. In 
response to that request and in response to the substantive arguments asserted in the Brief 
of Appellant Defendants respond as follows: 
L PRINSBURG IS BOUND BY ITS STIPULATION OF THE FACTS SET 
FORTH IN THE STIPULATED FINDINGS OF FACT. 
By stipulating to the facts set forth in the Stipulated Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Prinsburg is barred from appealing or otherwise disputing those 
facts. [R. at 577-583]. Both the parties and the court are generally bound by factual 
stipulations between the parties. First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel and 
Assoc., 600 P.3d 521, 527 (Utah 1979) ("Ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations 
between parties."); DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) ("It is settled that stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties . . . ."). 
Furthermore, a party cannot ordinarily challenge a stipulation on appeal. See, DLB 
Collection, 893 P.2d at 595 ("We find that having stipulated to the trial court's actions, 
the [Plaintiff] may not now complain about them on appeal." Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 
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1262, 1264 (Utah 1980) (finding that, having stipulated, defendant could not come 
forward to complain of the trial court's actions on appeal); Redevelopment Agency v. 
Mitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1372-73 (Utah 1974) (finding that, having stipulated at 
trial, defendant should not "feel too badly abused" by court's refusal to allow it to renege 
on its stipulation on appeal).'') (citations in original). 
This is equally true with regard to stipulated findings of fact on appeal. U.S. v. 
Firishchak, 468 F.3d 1015, 1023 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Ordinarily, stipulations of fact will 
obviate the need for appellate review of factual findings. . . . where the district court 
adopts a stipulated fact wholesale, it is binding on the parties and thus waived. . . .") 
(citation omitted); see also Begay v. First National Bank, 499 P.2d 1005, 1006 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1972) ("The stipulated findings became the facts of this case on appeal"). 
In this case, Prinsburg stipulated to the findings of fact set forth in the Stipulated 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and should be barred from challenging those 
findings of fact. Prinsburg did not expressly state that it was preserving its right to 
challenge any of the factual findings, nor was there an understanding between the Parties 
at the time the stipulation was entered into in that regard. As a result Prinsburg should be 
bound to those facts as stipulated. 
Although Prinsburg states that it is not challenging the Findings of Fact (see. e.g., 
Appellant's Brief at 20 ("stipulated facts are not subject to appeal")), that is exactly what 
it is trying to do. A substantial part of Prinsburg's argument is based on the allegation 
that the collateral it sold* "did not secure the Alpine loan." [Appellant's Brief at 18]. 
That allegation is partially factual (there was an event that rendered the collateral no 
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longer collateral for the loans) and partially legal (the effect of that event was to render 
the property no longer collateral). The factual portion runs expressly counter to the 
stipulated Findings of Fact. The legal portion runs counter to well-established law (see 
Argument, Article IV). As to the stipulated Findings of Facts, such facts make it clear 
that what Prinsburg sold was, in part, collateral for the Alpine Loan: 
Stipulated Fact 9. "In or around later 2006 and without providing notice to 
Defendants, Plaintiff and Vision Experts, dba Knighton Vision, held a private 
disposition of collateral in possession of Knighton Optical, including the collateral 
securing the Alpine Vision Loan." [R at 579 (emphasis added)]. 
Stipulated Fact 11. "Plaintiff received $80,000 for the property, including 
the collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan, in Knighton Optical5s possession." 
[R. at 579 (emphasis added)]. 
Despite these stipulated findings, Prinsburg now argues that what it sold was not 
"collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan.'' This, of course, is directly contrary to the 
stipulated Findings of Facts. 
The stipulated Findings of Fact established that (1) the Alpine Vision Loans were 
secured by collateral in the possession of Knighton Optical at the time of the private 
disposition of collateral; (2) Prinsburg did not provide notice to the Defendants of the 
private disposition of collateral; (3) the property disposed of at the private disposition of 
collateral was comprised at least in part of the Alpine Vision Collateral; (4) Prinsburg 
received $80,000 for all of the property disposed of at the private disposition; (5) no 
proceeds from the private disposition of collateral were applied to the Alpine Vision 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Loans; and (6) Prinsburg did not sell the Alpine Vision Collateral in a commercially 
reasonable manner. 
II. PRINSBURG SHOULD NOT BE FREE TO CHALLENGE STIPULATED 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Defendants have been consistent in acknowledging their understanding that at the 
Trial Court level, Prinsburg stated an intention (not expressed in the Findings and 
Conclusions) that it may wish to appeal the sole issue of the applicability of the UCC to 
this case based on the language of the guaranties. Defendants' understanding, however, 
simply has no relevance to issues of the jurisdiction of this Court or the preservation of 
issues for appeal. As to those issues, the Court of Appeals decision is correct. 
If, however, a party's understanding as to what the opposing party may, or may 
not, appeal, does have bearing, then the opposing party's appeal right should be 
determined in accordance with that understanding. In this case, Defendants understood 
that Prinsburg may want to challenge only the legal finding that the UCC applied to this 
case by reason of the guaranty language. [R. at 579, Conclusions of Law #1 and #3]. 
Prinsburg, however, should not be allowed to challenge other stipulated legal 
conclusions, such as the failure of Prinsburg to conduct the collateral sale in a 
commercially reasonable manner. This conclusion was not the result of an adversarial 
position taken by the parties, but was the product of an agreement between the parties. 
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, Prinsburg should not be able to challenge a 
conclusion of law that was not presented to the Trial Court for determination, but rather 
resulted from Prinsburg's own agreement. [Opinion at f 10]. 
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Similarly, Prinsburg should not be able to challenge conclusions of law7 not made 
by the Trial Court or raise arguments never made below. At the Trial Court level, 
Prinsburg only argued that Defendants were not entitled to notice of the collateral 
disposition, that its lien on such collateral ceased to exist upon the acquisition of the 
Alpine Vision entity by Knighton Optical, and that Prinsburg should be able to recover 
because the form of guaranties were "unconditional/'6 For example, Prinsburg made no 
mention of an "impairment of collateral" argument discussed in its Court of Appeal Brief. 
Not only did Prinsburg not raise such an argument below, such a legal conclusion was 
nowhere to be found in the Conclusions of Law. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
GUARANTIES WERE UNENFORCEABLE DUE TO PRINSBURG'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The Trial Court correctly held that Prinsburg failed to comply with the 
requirements of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by Utah 
(generally "UCC Article 9") and, therefore, could not enforce the Guaranties. 
A. UCC Article 9 Applies to Prinsburg's Disposition of Collateral. 
The Trial Court correctly determined that UCC Article 9 governed Prinsburg's 
foreclosure of its security interest in the Alpine Vision Collateral. [R. at 542-548, p. 3, 
6
 At the summary judgment level, Prinsburg did oppose Defendants' argument that 
the collateral sale was not commercially reasonable, but declined to present any evidence 
in support of that position when such time came. Instead, Prinsburg later stipulated that 
its sale was not commercially reasonable. 
7
 Of course, the reason why impairment of collateral was not addressed in the 
Conclusions of Law was because it was never argued below. 
1^ 
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(Ruling Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment]. Defendants do not dispute 
that Prinsburg had the right under the Guaranties to not proceed against the collateral but 
rather proceed directly against the Guarantors for satisfaction of the Alpine Vision Loan. 
Under that course of events, as correctly pointed out by Prinsburg, UCC Article 9 would 
not have been implicated. However, by electing to foreclose on and dispose of the 
collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan, Prinsburg's action became governed by UCC 
Article 9. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9a-608; 610; & 611. There is simply no escaping 
that critical fact. 
1. Prinsburg's Disposition of the Alpine Collateral Turned Its 
Claim Into A Deficiency Claim Against the Guarantors. 
Furthermore, Prinsburg's choice to dispose of the Alpine Collateral required the 
Trial Court to treat Prinsburg's claims against the Guarantors as deficiency claims. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-607 & 608. Again, Defendants acknowledge that Prinsburg 
was not required to take recourse against the Collateral, but in choosing to do so. 
Prinsburg must live with its consequences, one of which, as explained below, being that 
the proceeds from the sale of the collateral must be applied to the loan the collateral 
secures. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-608(l). Following such application of the 
proceeds, Prinsburg's recovery on the Guaranties is limited to the existence of a 
deficiency. See id. Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct in treating Prinsburg claim 
against the Guarantors as a deficiency claims under the facts of this case. 
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B. The Trial Correctly Determined that Prinsburg Had An Absolute 
Obligation To Provide Notice To The Defendants Of Its Sale Of The 
Alpine Vision Collateral. 
The Trial Court correctly determined that Prinsburg had an absolute obligation to 
provide notice to the Defendants of its private disposition of the Alpine Vision Collateral 
under UCC Article 9. [R. at 542-548, p. 4]. Section 70A-9a-611 of the Utah Code 
expressly requires in relevant part that: 
(2). . . [A] secured party that disposes of collateral under Section 70A-9a-
610 shall send to the persons specified in Subsection (3) a reasonable 
authenticated notification of disposition. 
(3) To comply with Subsection (2), the secured party shall send an 
authenticated notification of disposition to: 
(b) any secondary obligor[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-611(2)-(3). UCC Aiticle 9 broadly defines secondary obligors 
as an obligor whose "obligation is secondary/' which includes guarantors. Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9a-l 02(71). Accordingly, pursuant to § 70A-9a-611, Plaintiff had an 
obligation to provide Defendants, the secondary obligors, notice of its disposition of the 
collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan, which it failed to do. [R, at 468-473; 579, ^ 
9]-
Had the Defendants received notice of the foreclosure, they could have chosen to 
satisfy the debt and take possession of the collateral, purchase some or all of the 
collateral, seek other potential purchasers, or ensure that the sale was conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner, which are precisely the purposes of § 70A-9a-611. See 
?s 
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4 White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 34-12 (5 Ed.) ("The purpose of 
notice is to give the debtor an opportunity either to discharge the debt and redeem the 
collateral, to produce another purchaser or to see that the sale is conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner."). Defendants were never given that opportunity and, 
therefore, the Trial Court correctly concluded that Prinsburg had failed to comply with 
the notice requirement of UCC Article 9. 
1. Defendants Did Not Waive Their Right To Receive Notice of the 
Private Disposition of Collateral. 
The Trial Court correctly held that Defendants did not waive their right to receive 
notice. [R. at 542-548, p. 4], Under UCC Article 9, the notice requirements of § 70A-9a-
611 can only be waived by a properly authenticated agreement made after default. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-624 (emphasis added). No such agreement exists in this case. 
The boilerplate language of the guaranties regarding waiver does not satisfy this 
requirement, nor does it excuse Plaintiffs failure to comply with the notice requirement. 
2. Prinsburg's Failure to Give Notice as Required By UCC Article 
9 is Sufficient Grounds to Deny Prinsburg the Ability to Enforce 
the Guaranties. 
Prinsburg's failure to provide notice as required by § 70A-9a-611(2) is sufficient 
grounds alone to prevent Prinsburg from being able to enforce the Guaranties. Although 
Utah courts have not addressed this specific issue, courts in other jurisdictions have held 
that lack of notice alone is sufficient grounds to bar recovery. See, e.g., Honor State 
Bank v. Timber Wolf Construction Co., 391 N.W.2d 442, (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
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that failure to provide notice of disposition of collateral barred recovery against 
guarantor). 
C. The Proceeds From The Sale Of Alpine Vision Collateral Should Have 
Been Applied To Satisfaction Of The Alpine Vision Loan. 
The Trial Court correctly held that even if Prinsburg's de facto disposition of the 
Alpine Vision Collateral was properly noticed, any monies received by Prinsburg for the 
Alpine Vision Collateral should have been applied to the Alpine Vision Loan. [R. at 542-
548, p. 5]. Section 70A-9a-608 of the Utah Code provides: 
(1) If a security interest or agricultural lien secures payment or performance of an 
obligation, the following rules apply: 
(a) A secured party shall apply or pay over for application the cash 
proceeds of collection or enforcement under Section 70A-9a-607 in the 
following order to: 
(i) the reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement. . .; 
(ii) the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or 
agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement is made;. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-608. It is undisputed that Prinsburg did not apply any of the 
proceeds from its sale of the Alpine Vision Collateral to the Alpine Vision Loan. [R. at 
579,1(13]. 
The Guarantors do not dispute that they waived "any right to require Lender (c) to 
resort to payment or to proceed directly or at once against any person, including 
Borrower or any other guarantor; (d) to proceed directly against or exhaust any collateral 
held by Lender from Borrower, any other guarantor or any other person; . . ." [R. at 285-
287]. However, they did not waive their right to have the proceeds from the sale of the 
27 
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Alpine Vision Collateral applied to the obligation that they were guaranteeing. 
Therefore, at the very least, any amounts owed by the Guarantor Defendants under the 
Alpine Vision Loan must be reduced by the amount that Alpine Vision Collateral should 
have sold for in a commercially reasonable sale. 
D. Prinsburg's Foreclosure Of The Alpine Vision Collateral Was Not 
Commercially Reasonable. 
Prinsburg's private disposition of the Alpine Vision property was not 
commercially reasonable and, therefore, Plaintiff should be barred from recovering under 
the subject guaranties. Section 70A-9a-610(2) of the Utah Code states in part that 
"[e]very aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place 
and other terms, must be commercially reasonable." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-610(2). 
Prinsburg stipulated that the disposition of the Alpine Collateral was not conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner. [R. at 581, ^ 16]. Furthermore, the only facts within 
the Record demonstrate that Plaintiffs disposition failed to .meet the commercially 
reasonable standard. [Defendants' Statement of Facts ffl[ 9-13; Additional Facts ^ 3-8]. 
At the private disposition of collateral Knighton Vision purchased the entirety of 
the property for $80,000. [Defendants' Statement of Facts j^ 11]. Knighton 
Optical's/Alpine Vision's own assets records sent to Plaintiff on April 18, 2005, listed the 
depreciated value of the Alpine Vision equipment between approximately $250,000.00 
and $348,000, and provided a combined depreciated value including Knighton OpticaPs 
equipment of between approximately $1,770,000 and $1,930,000. [Additional Facts ffl| 
10-11]. Knighton Optical stated a combined '"book value" of between approximately 
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$1,054,000 and 1,150,000. Plaintiff did not conduct any form of valuation of the 
collateral prior to the disposition. [Additional Facts Y\\ 3-5]. Furthermore, as set forth 
above, Plaintiff failed to provide notice to Defendants. See, e.g., Haggis Management, 
Inc. v. Turtle Management, Inc., 745 P.2d 442, 444-45 (Utah 1985) (holding that the 
secured party was barred from recovery of a deficiency judgment for failure to provide 
notice of the disposition of collateral on the grounds that the disposition was 
commercially unreasonable). Finally, Plaintiff failed to separate Knighton Optical9s 
property from Alpine Vision's property, thus failing to preserve the collateral securing 
the Alpine Vision Loan. [Defendants' Additional Facts <[) 3]. 
Accordingly, Prinsburg cannot meet its burden in demonstrating that the de facto 
disposition of the Alpine Vision collateral was commercially reasonable and, therefore, 
Plaintiff should not be permitted to recover on the subject guaranties. 
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Determining that If the Disposition of 
Collateral Was Not Commercially Reasonable, Prinsburg Would Be 
Barred From Recovering against Defendants. 
The Trial Court correctly determined that if Prinsburg's disposition of collateral 
was not commercially reasonable, Prinsburg would be barred from recovering a 
deficiency. The most recent Utah case to address this precise issue is Haggis 
Management, 745 P.2d at 444-45, which held that "a secured party who fails to dispose 
of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner is barred from recovering a deficiency 
judgment." Id. at 444. In Haggis Management, like the present case, the secured creditor 
took possession of the collateral and disposed of it through a private disposition without 
notice to the guarantor. Id. at 442-444. The court concluded that the failure to provide 
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notice of the private disposition of collateral caused the disposition of collateral to fail to 
meet the commercial reasonableness standard and, as a result, Haggis Management was 
barred from recovering on its deficiency claim. Id at 444-445. 
Here, Prinsburg, like the Plaintiff in Haggis Management, failed to give notice to 
the Defendants of the disposition of collateral, which is sufficient to establish that the 
disposition was not commercially reasonable. [Defendants' Statement of Facts f^ 9]. 
Accordingly, Prinsburg should be barred from recovering from the Defendants. 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
TRANSFER OF COLLATERAL TO KNIGHTON OPTICAL DID NOT 
DESTROY THE SECURITY OF THE ALPINE LOANS. 
The Trial Court correctly rejected Prinsburg's argument that the transfer of 
collateral to Knighton Optical destroyed the security of the Alpine Loans, thus making 
them "unsecured" loans. 
A. The Alpine Vision Loans Were Not Unsecured And The Security 
Interest Continued in the Alpine Collateral. 
Prinsburg's substantive appeal largely rests on the factual and legal allegation that 
at the time of the sale, none of the collateral secured the Alpine Loans. As stated above, 
this allegation runs directly counter to the stipulated Findings of Fact. It also runs 
counter to well-established law. 
A sale of an equity interest in a company is not a sale of the underlying assets. 
But, even if Knighton Optical's acquisition of the rest of the Alpine Vision stock was a 
sale of Alpine Vision's assets, governing law provides that security interests continue 
notwithstanding such a sale. UCC Article 9 expressly states that "a security interest. . . 
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continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition 
thereof unless the secured party authorizes the disposition free of the security interest. . . 
." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-315(a). No evidence was submitted that First Security 
(Prinsburg's predecessor) authorized the disposition. Therefore, even if there had been a 
sale of the property (and not the stock of the company), the collateral continued to serve 
as collateral for the Alpine Loan. 
Notably, contrary to the position taken in this appeal, at the time Prinsburg 
foreclosed the collateral, it believed that Alpine had an interest in the property. 
[Additional Facts |^ 8; R. at 468-473]. In foreclosing on the Knighton Optical/Alpine 
Vision collateral, Prinsburg served the Notification of Private Disposition of Collateral on 
Alpine Vision.8 [Id]. 
B. The Record Demonstrates that the Alpine Collateral was Segregated in 
Knighton's Business Records. 
Not only was there never a transfer of direct ownership, Knighton Opticafs own 
records clearly show that Knighton Optical continued to differentiate between Knighton 
Opticafs property and Alpine Vision's in its Asset Depreciation Report. [R. at 475-507, 
Brief of Appellant, Appendix, Exhibit 9]. The Asset Depreciation Report designates a 
category as "Alpine Equipment" and identifies at least some of the equipment owned by 
Alpine Vision and pledged as security for the Alpine Vision Loans. [R. at 506-507; see 
also R. at 165-210, Knighton Optical (Including Alpine Vision) Fixed Asset Schedule]. 
Prinsburg, however, failed to serve this statutory notice on Alpine's guarantors. 
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Accordingly, the only evidence in the Record supports the position that the Alpine Vision 
Collateral was kept separate at least from a record keeping standpoint. 
V. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ASSERTED AN IMPAIRMENT OF 
COLLATERAL DEFENSE NOR DID PRINSBURG RAISE THIS 
ARGUMENT BELOW AND, THEREFORE, IT IS WAIVED. 
Prinsburg expended significant time in its Court of Appeals Brief attacking an 
alleged impairment of collateral defense. Defendants, however, have not asserted an 
impairment of collateral defense. An impairment of collateral defense is an argument 
that the secured party did, or failed to do, something that resulted in a reduction in the 
value of the collateral securing a loan. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-605(5). 
Defendants have not made the claim that Prinsburg failed to protect or preserve the 
collateral. Rather, Defendants have asserted, and prevailed on, the defense that Prinsburg 
failed to provide the requisite notice, conduct the foreclosure in a commercially 
reasonable manner or otherwise comply with a secured party's obligation under UCC 
Article 9 when choosing to foreclose a security interest in collateral. Thus, Prinsburg's 
lengthy argument regarding waiver of subrogation rights and impairment of collateral 
defenses is simply irrelevant. [Court of Appeals Brief of Appellant, at pp. 34-44]. 
Finally, even if Defendants had raised an impairment of collateral defense, 
Prinsburg raises this issue for the first time on appeal and, therefore, it should be deemed 
waived and should be disregarded. "As a general rule, in order for an appellate court to 
review contentions of error on appeal, the errors must be objected to or be preserved in 
the trial court record." Utah v. Horde, 2002 UT 4 ^15, 57 P.3d 977. 
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ATTORNEY FEES 
L DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL 
The trial court awarded Defendants their attorney fees and costs pursuant to the 
written attorney fee provisions in the Guaranties. [R. 668-669; R. at 687-688]. Prinsburg 
does not appeal the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs. [Appellant's Brief at 1 
(Statement of Issues)]. If Defendants prevails on appeal, they should be entitled to 
recover their fees and costs incurred on appeal. See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth 
Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1997) (where party entitled to attorney fees 
below prevails on appeal, award of attorney fees on appeal is proper); Management 
Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) (holding that 
contract provision allowing for attorney fees includes those fees incurred on appeal as 
well as at trial). Accordingly, if Defendants prevail on this appeal, they request this 
Court award them all attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that this Court affirm the Court of 
Appeals Opinion. In the event that this Court reverses the Court of Appeals decision and 
reviews the merits of Prinsburg original appeal, Defendants request that this Court affirm 
the Trial Court's Judgment. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the 29th day of February, 2012,1 caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, together with a PDF version, 
to be mailed via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brad C. Smith 
Samuel A. Hood 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84403 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of February, 2012. 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
Uake,0. M£ner_ 
T. Zenker 
Attorneys for Roland Abundo, Lindsay T. 
Atwood, Donald W. Baker and Jeffrey Gold 
RULE 24(f) CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief contains, according to the word count 
feature of the word processing program used to prepare this Brief, 8,345 words, and 
therefore, complies with requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24(f).. 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
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Stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
VD30436995 pages: 7 
060901846 ABUNDO.ROLAND E 
Blake D. Miller (4090) 
Joel T. Zenger (8926) 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
165 Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801.363.5600 
Facsimile: 801.363.5601 
Attorneys for Defendants Roland E Abundo, 
Lindsay T. Atwood, Donald R. Baker, and Jeffrey Gold 
m&, IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'& 
PRINSBURG STATE BANK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROLAND E. ABUNDO, LINDSAY T. 
ATWOOD, ROBERT THURSTON, 
DONALD R. BAKER, JEFFREY 
GOLD, KNIGHTON OPTICAL, INC. 
. AND ALPINE VISION, INC. 
Defendants. 
1 1 
STIPULATED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 060901846 
Honorable Scott M. Hadley 
1 
Plaintiff Prinsburg State Bank and Defendants Roland E. Abundo, Lindsay T. Atwood, 
Donald R. Baker, and "Jeffrey Gold (collectively "Defendants"), by and through their respective, 
counsel, stipulate to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which resolve this 
matter in its entirety in favor of Defendants with the exception of a determination of the amount 
of reasonable attorneys fees and costs to be awarded Defendants as the prevailing part)'. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In approximately 1994 Defendant Lindsay Atwood and a business partner formed 
Alpine Vision, Inc., which operated a vision care business at a number of locations along the 
Wasatch Front. 
2. In or around 1997 Knighton Optical purchased a majority interest in Alpine Vision 
and within a couple of years was the sole owner of Alpine Vision, including Alpine Vision's 
personal property, which included Alpine Visions eye examination equipment 
3. Knighton Optical .caused Alpine Vision to enter into two loan agreements on March 
30, 1998 and August 27,1999 with First Security Bank ("Alpine Vision Loan"), Plaintiffs 
predecessor in interest. 
4. The Alpine Vision Loan totaled $ 150,000, and was secured by Alpine Vision's 
equipment, inventory, accounts, and general intangibles. 
5. Defendants Atwood, Abundo, and Baker each executed personal guaranties for the 
Alpine Vision Loan, on or about July 28,1999. 
6. Although Defendant Gold has no recollection of signing any guaranty in relation to 
the Alpine Vision Loan, for purposes of resolving this dispute, Defendant Gold stipulates that he 
is a guarantor of the Alpine Vision Loan. 
7. On or about February 15, 2001, Knighton Optical purchased the remaining interest 
in Alpine Vision and became the sole owner of Alpine Vision's.assets, including the collateral 
securing the Alpine Vision Loan. 
2 
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8. On or about January 24, 2005, Knighton Optical made their last payment on the 
Alpine Vision Loan. 
9. In or around late 2006 and without providing notice to Defendants, Plaintiff and 
Vision Experts, dba Knighton Vision, held a private disposition of collateral in possession of 
Knighton Optical, including the. collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan. 
10. No evidence of the value of the disposed collateral was presented to the Court,. 
11. Plaintiff received $80,000 for the property, including the collateral securing the 
Alpine Vision Loan, in Knighton Optical5 s possession. 
12. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of the disposition proceeds that 
were attributable to the Alpine Vision Loan collateral. 
13. Plaintiff did not apply any of the proceeds from the private disposition to the Alpine 
Vision Loan but, instead, applied the entire amount to Knighton Optical's debts. 
CONCLUSIONS" OF LAW 
" 1. Article 9'(Secured Transactions) of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted b y 
Utah ("Article 9") governs the transactions at issue in this case. 
2. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-702(l) of the Utah Code, the current version of 
Article 9 of the UCC applies to Plaintiffs disposition of cdllatarel rather than the version in 
effect at the time the guaranties were signed. 
3. Article 9 governs Plaintiffs private disposition of the collateral securing the 
Alpine Vision Loan. 
D 
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4. Any transfer of the Alpine Vision, collateral to Knighton Optical did not destroy 
the securit}7 of the Alpine Vision Loan. 
5. The fact that the guaranties authorized Plaintiff to proceed against the collateral 
does not negate Plaintiffs duty to comply with the requirements of Article 9. 
6. Pursuant to 70A-9a-102(71), the Defendants are secondary obligors of the Alpine 
Vision Loan. 
7. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-611(2), as secondary obligors, the Defendants are 
entitled to notice of the disposition of any collateral securing the obligation. 
8. Therefore, Plaintiff was required to provide notice to the Defendants of the 
private disposition of collateral. 
9. Plaintiff violated Section 70A-9a-611(2) by failing to provide notice of the private 
disposition of collateral to Defendants. 
10. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-624, secondary obligors cannot waive their right to 
notice until after default of the obligations. 
• 11. Defendants did not waive their right to notice after Knighton Optical's default on 
the Alpine Vision Loan, 
12. Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-608, any proceeds from the sale of the Alpine Vision 
Collateral in excess of the reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement should have been 
applied to the obligation secured by the collateral 
13. Plaintiff failed to apply any of the proceeds from the sale of the Alpine Vision 
Collateral to the Alpine Vision Loan, in violation of Article 9. 
4 
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14. Pursuant to Section 70 A-9a-610(2). any disposition of collateral must be 
performed in a commercially reasonable manner. 
15. If the disposition of collateral is not conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner, the creditor is barred from recovering a deficiency judgment against any guarantors. 
•16. In light of the above facts and conclusions, including the lack of any evidence of 
the value of the collateral sold, Plaintiffs private disposition of collateral was not conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner and, therefore, Plaintiff is barred from recovering deficiency 
judgments from Defendants. 
17. Defendants are the prevailing party in this lawsuit and pursuant to the attorney fee 
provision in the subject guaranties, are entitled to an award of their reasonable attome)' fees and ' 
costs incurred in defending against Plaintiffs claims. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
Defendants-shall submit an application for attorney fees for the Court's consideration. 
Defendants shall also submit a proposed Final Judgment and Order consistent with these findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. The proposed Final Judgment and Order shall not be entered 
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DATED this _gT day of JQJ3Z. 2009. 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Honorable Scott M. Hadley 
So STIPULATED: 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
ffier 
Joel T. Zengef 
Attome}^ for Defendants Roland E. Abundo, 
Lindsay T. Atwood, Donald R. Baker, and Jeffrey Gold 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Prinsburg State Banlc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j^^TcLay of2iaiieiab©i^-2009,1 caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Hie foregoing STIPULATED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW upon the following by first-class mail, postage prepaid: 
Brad C. Smith 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUL 2 9 2011 
Prinsburg State Bank, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
Roland E. Abundo; Lindsay T. Atwood; 
Robert Thurston; Donald R. Baker; 
Jeffrey Gold; Knighton Optical, Inc.; and 
Alpine Vision, Inc., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
Case No. 20100712-CA 
F I L E D 
(July 29, 2011.) 
2011 UT App 239 
Second District, Ogden Department, 060901846 
The Honorable Scott M. Hadley 
Attorneys: Brad C. Smith and Samuel A. Hood, Ogden, for Appellant 
Blake D. Miller and Joel T. Zenger, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Davis, Thome, and Roth. 
THORNE, Judge: 
J l Prinsburg State Bank (Prinsburg) appeals from the district court's judgment of 
dismissal, which was issued upon the stipulation of the parties. We affirm. 
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BACKGROUND 
f2 In April 2006, Prinsburg sued Robert Thurston; Knighton Optical, Inc. 
(Knighton); and Alpine Vision, Inc. (Alpine) over two loan agreements entered into 
between Alpine and Prinsburg's predecessor in interest. The lawsuit also named 
Roland E. Abundo, Lindsay T. Atwood, Donald R. Baker, and Jeffrey Gold (collectively, 
the Guarantors), who had each executed a personal guarantee for these loans. After it 
had initiated the lawsuit, Prinsburg arranged to have certain collateral securing the 
loans sold. Prinsburg did not give notice of the sale to the Guarantors, nor did it apply 
the profits of the sale to the Alpine loans. Rather, it applied the profits to other debt 
owed by Knighton, which had acquired a majority ownership interest in Alpine. 
f 3 When Prinsburg sought to recover the monies due on the loans by filing this 
lawsuit, the Guarantors defended on the grounds that Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code applied to Prinsburg7 s disposal of the collateral and that Article 9 
required presale notice to the Guarantors, the application of sale proceeds to the 
secured loans, and a commercially reasonable sale. The district court granted partial 
summary judgment to the Guarantors, ruling that Article 9 applied and required notice, 
but reserved the issue of whether the sale was commercially reasonable for trial because 
there were unresolved material questions of fact on that issue. 
14 The parties subsequently submitted a signed document entitled Stipulated 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The stipulation stated that Prinsburg and the 
Guarantors "stipulate[d] to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which 
resolve this matter in its entirety in favor of Defendants with the exception of a 
determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys fees and costs to be awarded 
Defendants as the prevailing party/7 The parties7 stipulation went further than the 
district court's summary judgment ruling in that it stated that the sale was not 
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 
15 Expressly relying on the parties7 stipulation, the district court proceeded to enter 
judgment dismissing all of Prinsburg7s claims with prejudice. The judgment stated that 
the parties7 prior stipulation had 7/resolved all outstanding issues except attorneys7 fees77 
and that "Plaintiffs claims against Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice for 
the reasons set forth in the Court7s Memorandum Decision and the Stipulated Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law/7 The parties did not stipulate to the judgment itself, 
but the-judgment was drafted by Prinsburg7 s counsel. Prinsburg did not seek relief 
from the judgment in the district court prior to bringing this timely appeal. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f 6 Prinsburg raises multiple issues on appeal, arguing that the guarantees are 
enforceable, that Article 9 did not apply to the guarantees, and that the Guarantors 
waived their subrogation rights. We do not reach these issues because we determine 
that the district court properly entered the judgment pursuant to the parties' 
stipulation. See generally John Deere Co. v.A&H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah C t 
App. 1994) (stating that we review a trial court's enforcement of a stipulated settlement' 
agreement only for abuse of discretion). 
ANALYSIS 
f 7 Prinsburg asks us to review questions on appeal that were expressly resolved 
against it in the parties' stipulation and the resulting judgment. We determine that 
Prinsburg failed to preserve these issues for appeal when it stipulated to their resolution 
and did not subsequently ask the district court to limit or modify the judgment 
resulting therefrom. 
18 "Generally, a trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement agreement will 
not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse of discretion/7 Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, determinations as to the intended scope of 
a stipulation or settlement agreement present questions of fact that are appropriately 
directed, in the first instance/to the district court. See Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65,f 73, 221 P.3d 234 
("The intent of the parties involves a question of fact and should be dealt with 
accordingly."). And, in order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must initially 
present it "to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule 
on that issue." 438 Main Si v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f 51, 99 P.3d 801 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
19 Here, the parties unambiguously stipulated to the factual resolution of the sole 
issue that survived summary judgment, and their written stipulation expressly stated 
that it "resolve[d] this matter in its entirety in favor of Defendants." (Emphasis added.) 
Any doubt that the stipulation resolved the entire matter was removed when the 
district court entered judgment, in an order drafted and submitted by Prinsburg's 
counsel, dismissing all of Prinsburg's claims, "[b]ased upon . . . the [parties'] Stipulated 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
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110 If Prinsburg believed that the judgment of complete dismissal exceeded the scope 
of the parties7 agreement, it should have sought relief from the judgment in the district 
court on that basis. Such relief could have been sought pursuant to rule 59 or 60 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (allowing motions to alter or 
amend a judgment); id. R. 60 (allowing motions for relief from judgment). Prinsburg's 
failure to seek such relief renders its current arguments unpreserved for appeal, and we 
decline to address them. 
CONCLUSION 
111 Prinsburg stipulated to the complete resolution of this matter and failed to seek 
relief from the resulting judgment in the district court. Accordingly, its arguments have 
not been preserved for appeal and we do not address them. Affirmed.1 
William A. Thome Jr., Judge 
f 12 WE CONCUR: 
Stephen L. Roth, Judge 
1. We do not intend our decision to preclude Prinsburg from prospectively seeking 
relief from the judgment in the district court and we express no opinion on the 
availability of such relief. 
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NOTIFICATION 
OF 
PRIVATE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL 
To: Debtor; 
Knighton Optical, Inc. 
404 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84404 
Other Interested Parties: 
See attached Exhibit A 
From: Secured Party: 
Prinsburg State Bank 
508 Third Street 
Prinsburg, MN 56281-0038 
Care of: Scott Larison 
Gray Plant Mooty 
1010 West St Germain #600 
St. Cloud, MN 56301 
Description of Collateral: 
All of the personal property of the Debtor 
other than inventory and accounts 
receivable, including the property 
described on Exhibit B attached hereto. 
"We will sell the Collateral described above privately sometime after August 25,2006, " 
You are entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness secured by "the property that we intend to 
sell at no charge. You may request an accounting by calling us at (320) 252-4414. 
PRINSBURG STATE BANK 
B3^ 
Scott T. Larison 
GRAY PLANT MOOTY 
1010 West St Germain Street, Suite 600 
St Cloud, MN 56301 
Attorney for Secured Party . 
V. v. J. \U i 
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EXHIBIT A 
LIST OF OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 
NOALL C. KNIGHTON 
5279 SOUTH 1035 EAST 
SOUTH OGDENUT 84403 
DAMEL J. KNIGHTON 
5711 SOUTH 3850 WEST 
ROYUT 84067 . 
GARY A. KNIGHTON 
2384 NORTH 1350 EAST 
NORTH OGDENUT 84067 
WELLS FARGON.A. 
PO BOX 8203 
BOISE ID 83707-2203 
UCC DIRECT SERVICES 




95 ROUTE 17 SOUTH SUITE 310 
PARAMUS NJ 07652 
UTAH TAX COMMISSION 
ATTN: TECHNICAL RESEARCH 
210 NORTH 1950 WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84134 
ALPINE VISION INC 
404 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
OGDENUT 84404 
GP:1978770vl 
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BENCH L/O BLCK 
BLINDS 
BOARDS 
BOOKCASE & FILE 








CASH REG, TABLE, CHR 
CASH REGISTERS 
CENTRAL CTRL CTR 
CHAIRS 
CHAIRS AND TOOLS 










DELTA COMP SOFTWARE 
DESKS & CHAIRS 
















EDGER WHEELS , 
EDGER, CUTTERS 








FAX CANON SF 2114 






FILES AND DESKS 
FIRE FILE AND SAFE 
FISHER PRICE 
FLDNG CHAIRS & TABLE 
FLOOR MATS 
FOLDING TABLES 
FORMICA COUNTER TOS 
FRAME BD W/SHELF 
FRAME WARMERS 
FREE STD DISPLAYS 
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ID FALL SIGN 
ID FALLS PHONE 
J & E PICTURE 





L/H IMPMTS CAB 
L/H IMPMTS ELECT. 
L/H IMPMTS TILE 













LHI-SHOWER AND SHELVES 
LIGHT BOX 
LIGHTS 
L O G O PARIS DISPLAYS 
L O H V 1 0 0 MACHINE 
LONG LINK 









MISC COMPUTER HDWR 




MNT ENERGY LEASE IMP 
MODEMS 









Ol - SHOP EQUIP 
OPTICAL DESKS 
OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 







































SMART LAB DRILL 
SOFFITS 
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PROOF OF fittPVTnr 
KNIGHTON OPTICAL, INC. 
404 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
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